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This Article reviews significant cases during the Survey period on the
subjects of confession, search, and seizure from the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals, the Texas courts of appeals, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, and the United States Supreme Court.
I. TEXAS CASES
A. "SEIZURE" AND THE TEXAS CONSTITUTION
N 1991, the United States Supreme Court's decision in California v.
Hodari D.1 altered the Fourth Amendment definition of "seizure."
In Hodari D., the Court departed from the notion that a "seizure"
occurs from the time a reasonable person facing a show of authority be-
lieves he or she is not free to leave and formulated a new standard, hold-
ing that a "seizure" occurs at the time the suspect has actually yielded to
the show of authority or been physically forced to yield.2 In Johnson v.
State,3 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals adopted the Supreme Court's
revised definition of "seizure" in interpreting Article I, section 9 of the
Texas Constitution. The court specifically upheld the continuing viability
of Heitman v. State,4 but cautioned that Heitman will justify a departure
from the federal standard only where the facts of the case, state prece-
dent on the issue, and state policy dictate.5 The facts presented in John-
son, the court reasoned, did not warrant such a departure.6
In Johnson, police officers were on routine patrol in the public breeze-
way of an apartment complex. When the officers rounded a comer, John-
son immediately began to run. The police, lacking probable cause to
detain Johnson, nevertheless chased him, drew their weapons, and or-
dered him to stop. Before Johnson's capture, the police saw Johnson toss
aside a "Crown Royal" bag which was later found to contain illegal drugs
and a gun. The question as to when Johnson was "seized" by the police
was crucial to the court's analysis. If Johnson was "seized" when the po-
lice initially confronted him, and before he tossed the bag, no reasonable
suspicion existed to detain him.
The Court of Criminal Appeals followed the Supreme Court's reason-
ing in Hodari D., and held that, because Johnson did not actually yield to
the initial show of authority by the police, he was not "seized" under
1. 499 U.S. 621 (1991).
2. Id. at 627-28.
3. Johnson v. State, 912 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).
4. Heitman v. State, 815 S.W.2d 681, 690 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (holding that deci-
sions of the Supreme Court interpreting the Fourth Amendment are not binding upon
Texas courts in their interpretations of Article I, section 9 of the Texas Constitution).
5. Johnson, 912 S.W.2d at 234.
6. Id.
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Article I, section 9 of the Texas Constitution until he was physically de-
tained. 7 By that time, the court reasoned, the police had already seen
Johnson discard the bag containing the contraband, thereby giving the
police reasonable suspicion to seize him. 8
B. APPELLATE DEFERENCE IN THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE CONTEXT
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has traditionally adopted a broad
policy of deference to the courts of appeals in reviewing suppression is-
sues.9 The high court will not interfere with an appellate court decision
as long as the court of appeals, in reviewing the trial court, used the cor-
rect legal standard, considered all relevant evidence in the record, and
afforded proper deference to the trial court as the primary fact finder.10
In Dubose v. State," the Court of Criminal Appeals added new
strength to the general rule of deference. In that case, the court reversed
the appellate court, holding that the appellate court had not afforded
proper deference to the trial court as the primary fact finder regarding
the legal significance of historical facts. 12
In Dubose, police approached and asked Dubose if they could search
his outer clothing. Dubose agreed. The police then asked Dubose if they
could search the inside of his pants. Again, Dubose agreed. The police
then asked Dubose to remove his shoes. When he did, a plastic bag of
methamphetamine fell out. The trial court found Dubose consented to
the entire search. The court of appeals, however, held that there were
actually three separate searches, and that Dubose had not consented to
the search of his shoe. 13
The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed. The court held that the ap-
pellate court should have deferred to the trial court's findings regarding
the historical facts, as well as the trial court's conclusions regarding the
legal significance of the historical facts if the trial court had applied the
correct legal standard to those historical facts.' 4 The court explained that
appellate courts should reverse a trial court's decision only for an abuse
of discretion-that is, when it appears that the trial court applied an erro-
neous legal standard, or when no reasonable view of the record could
support the trial court's conclusion. 15 In this case, the court held that it
was reasonable to assume that the trial court had found that there was
one continuous search to which Dubose had consented, rather than three
7. Id.
8. For a recent discussion of the three recognized categories of interaction between
the police and citizens, namely, encounters, investigative detentions, and arrests, and the
respective justifications required for each, see Francis v. State, 922 S.W.2d. 176 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1996).
9. Arcila v. State, 834 S.W.2d 357 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
10. Id. at 360.
11. 915 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
12. Id. at 496.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 496-97.
15. Id. at 497-98.
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separate searches which each necessitated separate consent. 16 Therefore,
the court held that the court of appeals erred in conducting essentially a
de novo review of the facts.
C. ILLEGAL ARRESTS, CONFESSIONS, AND ATTENUATION OF TAINT
In Dowthitt v. State,17 the Court of Criminal Appeals addressed the
recurring issue of when a statement is sufficiently attenuated from an ille-
gal seizure to make the statement admissible at trial. Dowthitt demon-
strates that the attenuation inquiry is extremely fact intensive.
Dowthitt came to the sheriff's office to give a written statement in a
murder investigation. At that time, law enforcement officials only sus-
pected Dowthitt's son of the crime. Dowthitt finished and signed the
statement at 11:00 a.m. and left for lunch. There were no Miranda warn-
ings given. Dowthitt returned at 1:00 p.m. and asked to change his earlier
statement because it contained a false alibi. A detective interrogated
Dowthitt sporadically until 6:00 p.m., when his second written statement
was signed. There were no Miranda warnings given in reference to the
second statement.
The police suggested that Dowthitt take a polygraph test due to the
inconsistencies between the two statements. Dowthitt agreed and,
although he was told that he was not a suspect, he was read his Miranda
warnings prior to the polygraph examination. The polygraph examina-
tion ended at 11:00 p.m. This portion of the interview was videotaped.
Approximately two hours later, Dowthitt made an incriminating state-
ment, recorded on videotape, about his presence at the crime scene. He
was then advised by police, for the first time, that he would not be per-
mitted to leave. The court reasoned that at this time, Dowthitt was in
"custody" and that the police had probable cause to place him under
arrest. 18
Dowthitt was given his Miranda warnings before signing his third writ-
ten statement, at approximately 3:55 a.m., wherein he did not admit to
committing the murders but he admitted to having been present during
the crime. Dowthitt was booked into custody. During the entire period
of time Dowthitt never asked to leave.
One of the many questions confronted by the court in Dowthitt was
whether Dowthitt's arrest fell within one of the warrantless arrest excep-
tions found in Article 14 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. 19 The
court held that it did not. The court explicitly found that there was no
evidence of imminent escape on the part of Dowthitt to justify his war-
rantless arrest.20 Thus, the court held that Dowthitt's warrantless arrest
was illegal.
16. Id. at 496.
17. 931 S.W.2d 244 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
18. Id. at 255-57.
19. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 14 (Vernon 1977).
20. Dowthitt, 931 S.W.2d at 260.
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The court next addressed whether Dowthitt's statements were fatally
tainted by the warrantless arrest. The court held that, under these cir-
cumstances, the taint of the illegal arrest and Dowthitt's custodial state-
ments were sufficiently attenuated to render the statements admissible.
In making this determination, the court applied the four-factor attenua-
tion test found in Brown v. Illinois.21 The court noted that while Miranda
warnings were given, the proximity between arrest and confession was
close, and there were no intervening circumstances. However, the court
reasoned, the fourth prong of the test, the purpose and flagrancy of the
police conduct, weighed more heavily in favor of the State.22
In addressing the purpose and flagrancy prong of the attenuation test,
the court stressed that the interrogation of Dowthitt began as noncus-
todial, and that Dowthitt had initiated the encounter when he returned
after lunch to correct his false alibi.23 Moreover, Dowthitt's custodial
statements appeared to flow as much from his precustodial admission to
being present at the murders as from his custody status.24 The court also
found that even if there was error in the admission of Dowthitt's state-
ments into evidence, any such error was harmless. 25
Using a similar analysis, the Beaumont Court of Appeals reached a
different result in Neese v. State.26 The court held that there was no atten-
uation of the primary taint of an illegal warrantless arrest and the sus-
pect's subsequent custodial statements. In Neese, police received a tip
from a confidential informant that the informant had arranged for Neese
to sell LSD to an undercover police officer at the house where Neese was
staying. The informant also told the police that Neese did not have a car
and that he would have to get a ride.
The police conducted surveillance on the house in question. They saw
Neese enter the house, exit the house approximately five minutes later,
and leave in a pickup truck driven by a female. Officers stopped the
pickup truck and asked Neese to exit the vehicle. Neese complied with
the request and officers patted him down for weapons. No weapons were
found on Neese. Neese was then handcuffed, prior to any police ques-
tioning of the driver, prior to the search of the vehicle, and prior to the
discovery that Neese had an outstanding warrant for his arrest.
Police then asked the driver for consent to search the truck. She con-
sented, and no drugs were found. The driver was released. Police told
the handcuffed Neese that they had confirmed his outstanding warrant
and Neese was taken to jail. Police returned to the house in question and
secured the owner's consent to search the premises for contraband; none
was found. Upon return to the county jail where Neese was taken, the
officer who had searched the house learned that Neese had stated that
21. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975).
22. Dowthitt, 931 S.W.2d at 261.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 262.
25. Id.
26. 930 S.W.2d 792 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1996, pet. ref'd).
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the drugs were at the house. The officer who had conducted the search of
the house informed Neese that he was returning to the house with a
search warrant, and that if he found drugs, the occupants would be
charged with possession, since the contraband was in their possession. In
response, Neese stated that he would show the officers where he had hid-
den the drugs if he could say goodbye to the occupants. Neese took the
officers to a shed behind the house where he divulged the location of a
large amount of LSD. On cross-examination, the officers testified that
Neese had never been given Miranda warnings, though this point was not
preserved on appeal.
The court of appeals held that, though a close call, the temporary inves-
tigative detention of Neese was valid.2 7 However, the court held that the
initial detention was converted into an illegal arrest once Neese was
handcuffed. 28 The court expressly rejected the State's argument that
Neese was not under arrest after the discovery of the outstanding war-
rant. The court explained that "[n]othing occurred between the stop, the
pat down, and the handcuffing that elevated the reasonable suspicion to
temporarily detain [Neese] to probable cause to arrest him."'29
In a strongly worded critique of the "flagrantly abusive" police con-
duct, the court concluded that not only was Neese's arrest illegal, there
was also no attenuation of the primary taint of the illegal arrest.30 Find-
ing no substantial basis in the record to support the trial court's ruling on
Neese's motion to suppress, the court reversed Neese's conviction and
remanded the cause for a new trial. 31
D. AUTOMOBILE SEARCHES
The special considerations involved in a police search of an automobile
and its passengers were the subject of several cases during the Survey
period. In Perry v. State,32 a Bay City police officer observed Perry run a
stop sign. During the routine traffic stop, the officer discovered that
Perry had failed to appear in two previous traffic cases and placed Perry
under arrest. During the inventory search of the vehicle, officers checked
the partially opened ashtray for change and discovered a partially un-
wrapped piece of white paper towel containing rocks of crack cocaine.
Perry was subsequently convicted of cocaine possession with the intent to
distribute.33
On appeal, Perry argued that the trial court erred in denying his mo-
tion to suppress the cocaine seized from his ashtray on grounds that the
inventory of the ashtray was an impermissible search of a "closed
27. Id. at 799.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Neese, 930 S.W.2d at 803.
31. Id.
32. 933 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1996, pet. ref'd).
33. Id. at 250.
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container. '34 While finding that the detention and subsequent arrest of
Perry were lawful, and that the police had good reason to inventory the
vehicle, the Court of Appeals, citing Autran v. State,35 noted that the
Texas Constitution provides a privacy interest in closed containers that is
not outweighed by the general policy considerations underlying an inven-
tory.36 Thus, the question before the court was whether a vehicle ashtray
is a "closed container" for the purposes of inventory purposes. The court
concluded that it is not, and while Perry's conviction was reversed on
other grounds, the court of appeals held that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion by admitting the evidence from the ashtray as an incident of
a proper impoundment and inventory search.37
In Rhodes v. State,38 the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that the
occupant of a vehicle is subject to proper investigative detention just as a
pedestrian. In this case, Fort Worth police officers saw a vehicle backing
through an intersection at 11:00 p.m. in a high crime area known for gang
activity. The police activated their vehicle's overhead lights and the sus-
pect vehicle accelerated. The police pursued and witnessed the passenger
opening the door of the suspect vehicle and dropping a "Crown Royal"
bag onto the street. The officers slowed their vehicle, grabbed the bag,
and dropped it on the floorboard of the patrol car without looking in it.
The officers resumed their pursuit, activated their siren, and the sus-
pect vehicle eventually stopped. The driver of the suspect vehicle fled
and one of the officers gave chase on foot. Rhodes, who was on the pas-
senger side of the suspect vehicle, remained in the car. Rhodes was or-
dered out of the vehicle by another officer, handcuffed, and escorted to
the patrol car. As Rhodes was being escorted to the car, the officer no-
ticed Rhodes drop a clear ziplock bag to the ground. It was later deter-
mined that the Crown Royal bag contained $321 in one-dollar bills, and
the bag dropped by Rhodes contained crack cocaine.
At trial, the officer who escorted Rhodes to the patrol car testified that
by handcuffing Rhodes he was detaining him to investigate the situation
and for the officer's safety, and that he was not placing Rhodes under
arrest.
On appeal, Rhodes argued that the cocaine was only discovered after
his illegal arrest and that the cocaine should have been suppressed as
"fruit of the poisonous tree."'39 Rhodes contended that the arrest was
illegal because the officer who detained him never articulated facts or
circumstances that gave him probable cause to make an arrest.40 The
appellate court disagreed. The court found that under the facts and cir-
cumstances of this case, the detention and handcuffing of Rhodes was
34. Id. at 250.
35. 887 S.W.2d 31, 41-42 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
36. Perry, 933 S.W.2d at 252.
37. Id. at 253.
38. 913 S.W.2d 242 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1995, pet. granted).




reasonable and justified.4 1 The court noted that the situation unfolded
late at night in a high-crime area and that Rhodes' conduct was not con-
sistent with innocent behavior. 42 The court also refused to adopt a
bright-line test providing that handcuffing is the equivalent of arrest.43
The court held that the officer made a lawful investigative detention of
Rhodes under Terry" and its progeny, which was further justified when
Rhodes dropped the cocaine in the officer's presence. The court accord-
ingly confirmed the propriety of Rhodes' warrantless arrest and his con-
viction was affirmed. 45
E. WARRANTLESS SEARCH/ABANDONMENT/CONSENT
In Franklin v. State,46 the Beaumont Court of Appeals wrestled with
the issue of when property can be said to have been legally abandoned
for Fourth Amendment purposes. Franklin, who was carrying one suit-
case and a small sports bag, hurriedly entered a Houston bus station forty
minutes prior to the bus' scheduled departure time. Franklin stood in line
at a gate and placed his suitcase on the floor in line beside him. Appear-
ing nervous, Franklin looked over his shoulder several times and scanned
the lobby. He then walked away from the gate and kept his gaze on the
bag. Franklin repeatedly looked at the nearby plain clothes police officer
and appeared increasingly nervous. Franklin eventually returned to the
gate, approached his suitcase and told the man who was in line in front of
him, Morales, that he needed to use the phone. Franklin asked Morales
to place his bag on the bus if the bus boarded while he was on the phone.
Franklin then left the boarding area and while he was gone the bus ar-
rived. Morales boarded the bus with Franklin's suitcase.
A police officer boarded the bus and asked Morales for consent to
search the suitcase. Although Morales indicated that it was not his suit-
case, the officer proceeded to search the suitcase, finding cocaine. De-
spite Franklin's denial to having any luggage other than the sports bag, he
was arrested.
Franklin was convicted of the drug offense. On appeal, Franklin com-
plained that the cocaine was obtained through an illegal warrantless
search and seizure of his suitcase and that the trial court erred in overrul-
ing his motions to suppress.47 The Court of Appeals found that the total-
ity of Franklin's conduct did not give police probable cause to search his
suitcase.48 "Such actions," the court explained, "either taken together or
separately, do not lead one to believe a crime has been committed or that
41. Id. at 249.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 248.
44. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968).
45. Rhodes, 913 S.W.2d at 249.
46. Franklin v. State, 913 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1995, pet. ref'd).
47. Id. at 238.
48. Id. at 239.
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the luggage contains contraband. '49
The State also argued that Franklin abandoned the suitcase prior to the
search and therefore did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in
the suitcase.50 However, the court held that Franklin did not abandon
the suitcase when he entrusted it to Morales. 51 The court also rejected
the State's contention that Franklin's disavowal of ownership of the suit-
case after it had already been searched was evidence of abandonment.5 2
Having found that Franklin had not abandoned the suitcase, that he
had a legitimate expectation of privacy in its contents, that the warrant-
less search was not supported by probable cause, and that there was no
valid third party consent to the search, the court reversed Franklin's con-
viction and remanded it to the trial court for a new trial.53
F. CONSENSUAL SEARCHES
In State v. Ibarra,54 the Houston Court of Appeals reaffirmed the bur-
den of proof required when the state relies on consent to justify a search.
Ibarra, charged with possession of marijuana and failure to pay the mari-
juana tax, filed a pretrial motion to suppress evidence that was obtained
by police during a search of his car. The trial court determined that
although the State had demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence
that Ibarra's consent was voluntary, it had failed to demonstrate by clear
and convincing evidence that Ibarra voluntarily consented to the search.55
The court concluded that Texas law required the State to demonstrate
that the consent to search was voluntary by clear and convincing evidence
and therefore granted Ibarra's motion to suppress.56
The State appealed, citing three decisions in which the Supreme Court
held that the Fourth Amendment only requires proof of consent to search
by a preponderance of the evidence. 57 The State urged the court to adopt
the lower burden of proof, arguing that Texas appellate decisions on
point were incorrectly based on Supreme Court decisions which had later
been clarified to provide for the lower burden of proof.58
Citing Heitman v. State59 for the proposition that Texas may provide
rights to its citizens in addition to those provided by the United States
Constitution, the Texas Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's ruling




51. Id. at 240
52. Franklin, 913 S.W.2d at 240.
53. id. at 241.
54. 918 S.W.2d 15 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, pet. granted).








G. INVESTIGATORY DETENTION AND REASONABLE SUSPICION
Several cases during the Survey period analyzed the issue of what cir-
cumstances create reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify an investiga-
tive detention. Because a determination of whether reasonable suspicion
exists is so fact intensive, the cases present widely divergent results.
In Strowenjans v. State,61 the Dallas Court of Appeals held that a police
officer's belief that the defendant's truck might be stolen because it "did
not belong in the area" amounted to nothing more than mere hunch or
suspicion, not reasonable suspicion necessary to justify an investigative
detention. 62
At 3:00 a.m., Dallas police officers saw a neat and clean late-model
pickup truck parked in front of a known drug house in a high crime area.
The officers, suspecting that the vehicle might be stolen, inspected the
truck for signs of forced entry; there were none. The officers checked the
truck's registration and learned that it had not been reported stolen. The
officer then decided to contact Strowenjans, the truck's owner. The of-
ficer reached Strowenjans' wife by telephone and she told the officer that
her husband was probably in the area where the truck was parked be-
cause he had a softball game in the area. The officer nonetheless re-
mained suspicious and requested that officers in an unmarked car watch
the truck.
Approximately forty-five minutes later, Strowenjans and another per-
son entered the truck and drove away. The officers were not able to de-
termine whether they had come out of the alleged drug house.
Strowenjans traveled approximately two miles and turned into a motel
parking lot that officers believed was frequented by prostitutes and drug
users. The police then activated the vehicle's overhead lights and stopped
the vehicle. Strowenjans exited his vehicle and produced his license,
which confirmed that he owned the truck. The police did not smell alco-
hol and when they frisked Strowenjans they discovered no weapons. A
separate officer approached the passenger and recognized her as a known
prostitute and drug addict.
The passenger told the officer that Strowenjans had cocaine in his
pocket. The officer the asked Strowenjans for consent to search his pock-
ets, and Strowenjans acquiesed. The first search did not reveal the co-
caine, and the officer asked if he could look deeper in Strowenjans'
pockets. Again, Strowenjans replied that he had no objection. This time
the officer found a small amount of cocaine, and Strowenjans was
arrested.63
The court of appeals found that the police did not have sufficient rea-
sonable suspicion to detain Strowenjans, that Strowenjans' actions were
61. 919 S.W.2d 142 (Tex. App.-Dallas), remanded, 927 S.W.2d 28 (Tex. Crim. App.
1996) (the court asked the court of appeals to reconsider its judgment in light of Waston v.
State, 924 S.W.2d 711 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)).
62. Id. at 147.
63. Id.
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as consistent with legal activity as they were with illegal activity, and that
the trial court erred in not suppressing the evidence obtained through the
search of Strownjans' pockets. 64
In Worley v. State,65 the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that an ar-
resting officer's seizure of the wrist of an individual suspected of purchas-
ing controlled substance was an investigative stop of the nature
contemplated in Terry. The intrusion was of short duration, lasting only
as long as it took the officer to seize the suspect's wrist and view gelatin
capsules contained in his hand.
Fort Worth police officers were patrolling in a marked car in an area
known for its drug activity. The officers noticed a truck stopped at an
intersection adjacent to a house known for illegal drug sales. As the of-
ficers approached the suspect vehicle, the driver immediately moved the
vehicle and gave the officers "a good hard stare" as they drove by. Given
the location of the suspect vehicle next to a house known for drug sales,
and the officers' knowledge that drug users purchasing illegal narcotics
normally traveled in pairs (one driver and one passenger), the officers
believed that a passenger retrieval was about to occur. Shortly thereafter,
the officers saw Worley walk out of the door of the house in question and
step onto the porch steps.
Worley's head was down and his left hand was cupped and open. As
Worley approached the street, an officer noticed three capsules in Wor-
ley's left hand. When Worley reached the curb, he saw the officers and
froze. The officers testified that Worley looked very nervous and scared.
Worley continued to stare at the officers until one of the officers was
within arm's reach. Worley then clenched his left hand and attempted to
turn away. As he turned, the officer grabbed Worley's left hand and
asked him what was in it. Worley offered mild resistance before opening
his hand, revealing the gelatin capsules containing heroin and cocaine.
The court of appeals held that the circumstances presented in the case,
taken as a whole, provided the officer with reasonable suspicion to be-
lieve Worley was engaged in criminal activity and thus justified the inves-
tigatory stop.66 The court held that the officer's seizure of Worley's wrist
represented a brief intrusion, and once the officer had the opportunity to
inspect the capsules, he clearly had probable cause to make the arrest.67
II. FEDERAL CASES
A. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASES
1. The Relevance of Motive to Traffic Stops Conducted for the Purpose
of Investigating Other Crimes
During the Survey period, the Supreme Court in Whren v. United
64. Id.
65. 912 S.W.2d 869 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1995, pet. ref'd).
66. Id. at 874.
67. Id. at 873.
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States68 declined to create an exception to the established rule that prob-
able cause justifies a search and seizure. In a unanimous opinion deliv-
ered by Justice Scalia, the Court held that no Fourth Amendment
violation occurs when an officer's otherwise justifiable probable cause de-
termination is motivated by an ulterior motive to investigate another pos-
sible crime.69 The Court's unanimous opinion illustrates its willingness to
uphold a search in almost any circumstance as long as probable cause
exists.
In Whren, plainclothes policemen patrolling a "high drug area" in an
unmarked car became suspicious when a truck paused at a stop sign for
an unusually long time, turned suddenly without signaling, and then sped
off. The policemen overtook the truck and one of the officers exited the
vehicle to approach the truck while it was stopped at a red light. The
plain clothes officer identified himself as a police officer and directed the
driver, Defendant Brown, to put the truck in park. The officer then ob-
served two large plastic bags appearing to contain crack cocaine in pas-
senger Whren's hands. Both Brown and Whren were arrested and
quantities of several types of illegal drugs were recovered from the truck.
Brown and Whren were convicted of violating various federal drug
laws. At a pretrial suppression hearing, the district court rejected the de-
fendants' argument that the officers lacked probable cause to believe the
defendants were engaged in illegal drug dealing activity, and that there-
fore the asserted ground for approaching the truck-a traffic violation-
was impermissibly pretextual.70 The district court thus denied the motion
to suppress.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia af-
firmed, holding that "regardless of whether a police officer subjectively
believes that the occupants of an automobile may be engaging in some
other illegal behavior, a traffic stop is permissible as long as a reasonable
officer in the same circumstances could have stopped the car for the sus-
pected traffic violation. '71 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
decide
whether the temporary detention of a motorist who the police have
probable cause to believe has committed a civil traffic violation is
inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against un-
reasonable seizures unless a reasonable officer would have been mo-
tivated to stop the car by a desire to enforce the traffic laws. 72
The Court started from the fundamental premise that an automobile
stop by the police constitutes a "seizure" within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment, and, as such, must comport with the constitutional
requirement that it not be "unreasonable. '73 The Court further acknowl-
68. 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1995).
69. Id. at 1774.
70. Id.
71. United States v. Whren, 53 F.3d 371, 375 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
72. Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1771-72.
73. Id. at 1772.
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edged that, in general, automobile stops motivated by probable cause to
believe that a traffic violation has occurred are constitutionally reason-
able.74 But, the defendants added another consideration in formulating
their challenge to the general principle that automobile stops are justified
by probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred. The
defendants contended that, because the use of automobiles is so heavily
and minutely regulated, total compliance is nearly impossible. 75 This, ac-
cording to the defendants, enables police officers to almost invariably
catch any motorist in a technical violation and thereby creates the temp-
tation to use traffic stops as a means of investigating other crimes, as to
which no probable cause exists. Because of these concerns, the defend-
ants argued that a different probable cause inquiry should be applied to
traffic stops: "whether a police officer, acting reasonably, would have
made the stop for the reason given.' '76 Stated differently, the defendants
intended that a search cannot be justified if a reasonable officer would
not have stopped the vehicle for the purpose of enforcing the traffic laws.
In support of their argument, the defendants relied on a line of
Supreme Court cases, which, they contended, disapproved of police reli-
ance on a valid basis for probable cause as a pretext for investigating
other crimes.77 The Court found the defendants' reliance on these cases
to be misplaced because each addressed the validity of a search wholly
lacking in probable cause.78 For example, administrative or inventory
searches, pursuant to judicially recognized exceptions, may be conducted
without probable cause. This exception, however, will not support an ad-
ministrative or inventory search not made for those purposes. 79 In other
words, a law enforcement officer may not conduct an inventory or admin-
istrative search for the purpose of investigating a crime for which no
probable cause exists.80 The court saw these examples as distinguishable
from this case, where the officer had valid probable cause as to the traffic
violation.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1772-73. In this case, the defendants conceded that the officer had probable
cause to believe that various provisions of the District of Columbia traffic code had been
violated. The District of Columbia traffic code provides that "[an operator shall ... give
full time and attention to the operation of the vehicle," 18 D.C. Mun. Regs. § 2204.3
(1985); that "[n]o person shall turn any vehicle ... without giving an appropriate signal,"
18 D.C. Mun. Regs. § 2200.3; and that "[n]o person shall drive a vehicle ...at a speed
greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions." Id.
76. Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1773 (emphasis added).
77. Specifically, the defendants relied on Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990) ("an
inventory search must not be used as a ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover
incriminating evidence"); Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372 (1987) (noting that as to a
valid inventory search, there was "no showing that the police, who were following standard
procedures acted in bad faith or for the sole purpose of investigation"); New York v. Bur-
ger, 482 U.S. 691, 716-17 n.27 (1987) (a warrantless administrative inspection did not ap-
pear to be a "a 'pretext' for obtaining evidence of ... violation of ... penal laws.").
78. Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1773-74 (emphasis added).




Not only did the Court find there to be a lack of affirmative support for
the defendants' argument, but the Court also pointed to contrary author-
ity which "foreclose[d] any argument that the constitutional reasonable-
ness of traffic stops depends on the actual motivations of the officers
involved." 81 The Court placed significant importance on United States v.
Robinson,82 where it held that a traffic violation arrest would not be ren-
dered invalid merely because it was a pretext for a narcotics search. 83
The Robinson Court further held that a lawful post-arrest search of the
offender would not be rendered invalid on grounds that it was not moti-
vated by the "officer safety" concern that justifies such searches.84 The
Whren Court explained that Robinson, and other related cases,85 estab-
lished that "the fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which
is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for
the officer's action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the
circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action." 86
The Court rejected the defendants' attempt to frame the standard they
advocated as an "objective" one, rather than a "subjective" one. The de-
fendants insisted that objective considerations governed the inquiry of
"whether the officer's conduct deviated materially from usual police prac-
tices, so that a reasonable officer in the same circumstances would not
have made the stop for the reasons given." 87 The Court, however, viewed
this inquiry as "plainly and indisputably driven by subjective considera-
tions."' 88 The "reasonableness" analysis mandated by the Fourth Amend-
ment, according to the Court, does not make the individual officer's
subjective motivation the touchstone of "reasonableness."
The Court dismissed the notion that the standard urged by the defend-
ants would involve a less strenuous evidentiary inquiry than a straight
subjective inquiry regarding the particular officer's state of mind. The
Court pointed to the difficulty of "plumb[ing] the collective consciousness
of law enforcement in order to determine whether a 'reasonable officer'
would have been moved to act upon the traffic violation. '89 The Court
also pointed to an additional problem with a standard that assesses
whether an officer, acting reasonably, would have chosen to enforce a
traffic violation. Such a standard would impermissibly result in Fourth
Amendment protection that varies from "place to place and from time to
time," according to the traffic regulations of the jurisdiction where the
81. Id. at 1774.
82. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
83. Id. at 221, n.1.
84. Id. at 236.
85. The Court also relied on United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579
(1983), and Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128 (1978).
86. Robinson, 436 U.S. at 138.
87. Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1774.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1775.
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traffic stop occurred. 90
Finally, the Court addressed the defendants' argument that the balanc-
ing of governmental interests and individual interests inherent to Fourth
Amendment "reasonableness" analysis militates against sanctioning in-
vestigation of minor traffic infractions by plainclothes police in unmarked
vehicles. The defendants contended that the governmental interest in
traffic safety was only minimal, as reflected by the police department's
own regulations generally prohibiting the practice. Conversely, the de-
fendants argued, as to the individual interests at stake, traffic stops con-
ducted by plainclothes officers in unmarked cars "may create substantial
anxiety."91
The Court recognized that a determination of the reasonableness of a
search or seizure necessarily involves a balancing of interests. However,
the Court explained, this balancing is invariably struck in favor of al-
lowing the search or seizure when the search was predicated on probable
cause, which ensures appropriate constraint of police action. The only
exception to the general premise that probable cause sufficiently protects
the individual interests at stake are cases where searches or seizures are
conducted in an extraordinary manner, as a seizure by use of deadly force
or an unannounced entry into a home.92 The officer in Whren unques-
tionably acted on valid probable cause to believe that various traffic vio-
lations had occurred, and therefore, the Court concluded, the stop was
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 93
2. Standard of Review of Determinations of Probable Cause and
Reasonable Suspicion
The Supreme Court resolved a conflict among the circuits in addressing
the standard of review applicable to probable cause and reasonable suspi-
cion determinations. 94 In Ornelas v. United States,95 the Court addressed
undisputed facts. A police detective conducting drug-interdiction sur-
veillance became suspicious of a 1981 two-door Oldsmobile with Califor-
nia license plates in a motel parking lot. The officer then learned the
90. Id. The District of Columbia police regulations permit plain clothes officers in
unarmed vehicles to enforce traffic laws "only in the case of a violation that is so grave as
to pose an immediate threat to the safety of others." Id. (citing Metropolitan Police
Dep't-Washington D.C., General Order 303.1, pt. 1, Objectives and Polices (A)(2)(4)
(Apr. 30, 1992)). Thus, if the officer in this case had been wearing a uniform, this provision
would not have applied and would not have served as a Fourth Amendment limitation as
urged by the defendants. The Court explained that it would be unacceptable to hold that
Fourth Amendment protections "are so variable, and can be made to turn on such triviali-
ties." Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1776.
91. Id. at 1776 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 657 (1979)).
92. Id. (citing Tennessee v. Garner, 472 U.S. 1 (1985) (deadly force); Wilson v. Arkan-
sas, 115 S. Ct. 1081 (1995) (unannounced entry into home)).
93. Id.
94. Ornelas v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 1661 (1996). For circuit cases in conflict
over the applicable standard of review, compare United States v. Puerta, 982 F.2d. 1297,
1300 (9th Cir. 1992) (de novo review) with United States v. Spears, 965 F.2d 262, 268-71
(7th Cir.) (clear error), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 989 (1992).
95. 116 S. Ct. 1657.
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name of the owner of the vehicle from a radio dispatcher and confirmed
with the motel registry that a man by a similar name, accompanied by a
second man, had registered at 4:00 a.m. without reservations. A subse-
quent search through a federal database of known and suspected drug
traffickers96 identified the name listed as owner of the vehicle and the
names registered at the motel as narcotics dealers.
When the two suspected men emerged from their motel room and got
into the Oldsmobile, one of the detectives approached the car, made sev-
eral inquiries, and was ultimately given consent to search the car. During
the search of the Oldsmobile's interior, the detective observed that a
panel appeared loose; he suspected that the panel might have been re-
moved and narcotics hidden inside. The detective removed the panel97
and discovered two kilograms of cocaine. The two men were arrested.
The district court denied the defendant's pretrial motions to suppress
complaining of the detective's warrantless search inside the panel. The
district court reasoned that the model, age, and source-state origin of the
car, and the fact that two men traveling together checked into a motel at
4:00 a.m. without reservations, formed a drug-courier profile. This pro-
file, together with the NADDIS reports, gave rise to reasonable suspicion
of drug-trafficking activity. Further, the district court found that this rea-
sonable suspicion gave rise to probable cause upon discovery of the loose
panel. 98
The Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court's determinations of rea-
sonable suspicion and probable cause for "clear error."99 The Seventh
Circuit found no clear error as to reasonable suspicion, but with regard to
the probable cause determination, remanded for a determination of
whether the detective's testimony regarding the loose panel was credi-
ble.100 On remand, the detective's testimony was found to be credible, a
determination that the Seventh Circuit subsequently held was not clearly
erroneous.' 0 '
In setting out to determine the appropriate standard of review, the
Supreme Court began by noting that the legal standards regarding prob-
able cause and reasonable suspicion are not readily reducible to a neat set
of legal rules.'0 2 Instead, probable cause and reasonable suspicion are
fluid concepts that derive meaning from the context in which they are
96. The federal database is known as the Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Information
System (NADDIS). Id. at 1659.
97. The lower courts assumed that consent to search the car did not provide the of-
ficers with authority to search inside the panel because under Seventh Circuit precedent,
the police may not dismantle the body of a car during an otherwise valid search, unless the
police have probable cause to believe the car's panels contain narcotics. Id. at 1660 (citing
United States v. Garcia, 897 F.2d 1413, 1419-20 (1990)). This Supreme Court declined to
address the correctness of the Seventh Circuit limitation on the scope of consent, assuming
its validity only for purposes of its decision.
98. Id.
99. United States v. Ornelas, 16 F.3d 714, 719 (7th Cir. 1994).
100. Id. at 721-22.
101. See Orlelas, 116 S. Ct. at 1661.
102. Id.
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assessed. 10 3 It follows that probable cause and reasonable suspicion are
determined by analysis of whether the events leading up to the stop or
the search, when viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable
police officer, amount to probable cause or reasonable suspicion. Thus,
the Court explained, the first part of the analysis is factual, but the second
part is a mixed question of law and fact. 1°4
The Court, noting that it had never expressly deferred to a trial court's
probable cause or reasonable suspicion determination, explained that
deferential review would permit "[i]n the absence of any significant dif-
ference in the facts, the Fourth Amendment's incidence to turn on
whether different trial judges draw general conclusions that the facts are
sufficient or insufficient to constitute probable cause.' 0 5 Moreover, be-
cause the concepts of probable cause and reasonable suspicion acquire
meaning only through application, the Court reasoned that independent
review is necessary for appellate courts to control and clarify the legal
principles associated with probable cause and reasonable suspicion.' 0 6 In
the same vein, the Court explained that plenary review would unify pre-
cedence providing law enforcement officers with a defined and predict-
able set of standards for determining probable cause and reasonable
suspicion.10 7
B. FIFTH CIRCUIT CASES
1. The Automobile Exception
In United States v. Sinisterra,10 8 the Fifth Circuit issued an important
opinion regarding the scope of the automobile exception to the warrant
requirement, further enhancing the strength of the exception to justify
warrantless searches of automobiles. In that case, the defendant arrived
at a house under surveillance in one car and ultimately left the house in a
van. The defendant then drove the van to a shopping mall, parked, got
out with a small dog, and then engaged in what the court termed "unu-
sual behavior."'1 9 For example, he walked around the mall, walked to a
nearby medical office building, rode a city bus for one and one-half miles
and walked back to the mall. During this time, the defendant made sev-
eral telephone calls from pay telephones.
After the agents lost the defendant in a neighborhood, they ap-
proached the van with a narcotics-detecting dog, who alerted strongly to
the van. The defendant thereafter returned to the mall parking lot, but
did not approach the van. After the officers arrested him, he refused to
consent to a search of the van. A United States Customs agent then ob-
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1662.
105. Id.
106. Id. (citing Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985)).
107. Id. (quoting New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981)).
108. 77 F.3d 101 (5th Cir. 1996).
109. Id. at 105.
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served through the van's window cellophane-wrapped packages consis-
tent in size and appearance to packages typically containing cocaine or
marijuana. The van was then towed to the police department. A war-
rantless search revealed approximately 200 kilograms of cocaine.
The district court granted the defendant's pretrial suppression motion
on grounds that the automobile exception to the warrant requirement
could justify a warrantless search only when both probable cause and exi-
gent circumstances existed. 110 The district court found no exigent circum-
stances because the police could have seized the van and later obtained a
warrant before searching the van.1" Moreover, in holding the automo-
bile exception inapplicable, the district court placed emphasis on the fact
that the van was parked in a privately owned parking lot, as opposed to a
public street. 1 2
The Fifth Circuit reversed. The court reasoned that "[tIhere is no con-
stitutional difference between 'seizing and holding a car before presenting
the probable cause issue to a magistrate and on the other hand carrying
out an immediate search without a warrant. Given probable cause to
search, either course is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.'l 1 3
Moreover, the court rejected the notion that the automobile exception
requires exigent circumstances other than the potential mobility of the
vehicle. The automobile exception applies, the court explained, when the
vehicle is "readily capable of being used on the highways and it is found
stationary in a place not regularly used for residential purposes." 1 4
Thus, concluded the court, probable cause alone justifies a warrantless
search of a vehicle parked in a public place. Here, the court found prob-
able cause based on the dog alert, the informant's tip, the defendant's
unusual behavior, and the agent's observation of suspicious packages in-
side the van. 1 5
Finally, the court dismissed the defendant's argument that the warrant-
less search was unjustified because the van was parked in a privately
owned mall parking lot. The court pointed to authority that the vehicle
need only be parked in a public place as opposed to a residential place. 1 6
The court expressly rejected the notion that a privately owned parking lot
could not constitute a public place for purposes of the automobile excep-
tion to the warrant requirement." 7
110. Id. The district court recognized that the plain-view exception to the warrant re-
quirement justified seizure of the van, but that, in the absence of an applicable exception, a
warrant or consent was required to justify the search. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 103-04.
113. Id. at 104 (quoting Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970)).
114. Id. (quoting California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392 (1985)).
115. Id. at 105.
116. Id. at 104-05.
117. Id. at 105 (citing United States v. Buchner, 7 F.3d 1149, 1150-51 (5th Cir. 1993)).
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2. The Independent Source Doctrine
Through an interlocutory appeal, the government challenged a district
court order suppressing evidence seized pursuant to a warrant obtained
after an illegal entry to the premises. The Fifth Circuit reversed the sup-
pression order, relying on a theory not initially considered by the district
court. In United States v. Hassan,118 United States Customs agents dis-
covered a woman in an airport carrying five pounds of heroin in a suit-
case. The woman then identified Hakeem Lawal as the individual who
recruited her to smuggle the heroin. After his arrest, Lawal agreed to
cooperate with the agents, and thereafter implicated the defendants in
the heroin scheme.119
Lawal then accompanied law enforcement officials to the defendants'
apartment. While just outside the apartment, one of the agents peeked
through the drawn mini-blinds to determine whether any of the occu-
pants were armed. The officer observed two of the defendants pouring a
white substance through what appeared to be a heroin strainer. Another
officer then knocked on the door; the defendants were observed franti-
cally moving back towards the table as the officer yelled "police." The
officer kicked in the door and the defendants were arrested inside. The
apartment was not searched until a warrant was obtained the following
day.
The district court suppressed the evidence seized pursuant to the war-
rant on grounds that the warrantless entry was not justified by exigent
circumstances. In a motion for reconsideration, the government argued
for the first time that, under the independent source doctrine, the subse-
quent acquisition of a warrant based on information independent of the
illegal warrantless entry justified the seizure of evidence seen in plain
view during the warrantless search. 120
The Hassan court explained that a two-part analysis governed the ap-
plicability of the independent source doctrine: (1) whether the warrant
affidavit, absent the tainted information gained through the illegal entry,
contains sufficient remaining facts to establish probable cause; and (2)
whether the illegal entry affected or motivated the officer's decision to
procure the search warrant.' 21 In reviewing a lower court's analysis of
each prong, the court noted that the first inquiry regarding the warrant
affidavit's sufficiency absent the tainted information required de novo re-
118. 83 F.3d 693 (5th Cir. 1996).
119. Il.
120. Id. The Hassan court summarily dismissed the defendants' contention that the
government waived its argument that the independent source doctrine justified admission
of the seized evidence by raising it for the first time in its motion for reconsideration. Id. at
696. Nonetheless, the court went on to conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in refusing to allow the government to present additional evidence on the in-
dependent source doctrine issue based on its failure to assert the issue prior to its motion
for reconsideration. Id. at 696-97. The government did not appeal the district court's con-
clusion that exigent circumstances did not exist. Id. at 696.
121. Id. at 697 (citing United States v. Restrepo, 966 F.2d 964, 966 (5th Cir. 1992)).
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view. 122 On the other hand, the second inquiry regarding the effect of the
illegal entry required clearly erroneous appellate review because it in-
volved a factual determination. 123
Attempting to obtain a deferential standard of review, the defendants
contended that the district court's determination that "but for the illegal
entry, the officers probably would not have had sufficient evidence to ob-
tain the warrant," involved a factual determination regarding the effect of
the illegal entry.' 24 Conversely, the government asserted that the district
court's finding should be reviewed de novo because it related to the suffi-
ciency of the warrant absent the tainted information. 125
Conceding that the district court's ruling contained ambiguous terms,
the Hassan court ultimately accepted the government's proposed stan-
dard of review. In reaching this conclusion, the court reasoned that the
language of the district court's order focused on the existence of sufficient
evidence to obtain the warrant, not on the motivations of the agents who
made the illegal entry and ultimately obtained the warrant.126
The Hassan court then concluded that, as a matter of law, the expur-
gated affidavit contained sufficient information to establish probable
cause.' 27 The court pointed to the tips from the informants, including
Lawal, and the customs agents' actual observance through the mini blinds
of the defendants cutting heroin. This information alone, lawfully ac-
quired, would have established probable cause to obtain the warrant. As
such, the court held that the district court erred in finding the independ-
ent source doctrine inapplicable based on a lack of probable cause.' 2 8
Finally, the court decided to remand as to the second independent
source doctrine factual inquiry regarding the effect of the illegal entry.129
To guide the district court's analysis, the Hassan court suggested that the
district court consider "the precise nature of the information acquired af-
ter the illegal entry, the importance of this information compared to all
the information known to the agents, and the time at which the officers
first evinced an intent to seek a warrant.' 30
3. Electronic Signal Alone Sufficient to Create Probable Cause
In United States v. Levine,131 the Fifth Circuit addressed for the first
time the issue of whether an electronic signal alone may constitute a suffi-
122. Hassan, 83 F.3d at 697 (citing Restrepo, 966 F.2d at 971; United States v. Phillips,
727 F.2d 392, 394-95 (5th Cir. 1984)).
123. Id. (citing Restrepo, 966 F.2d at 972; United States v. Andrews, 22 F.3d 1328, 1333




127. Id. at 698 (citing Restrepo, 966 F.2d at 972).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 699 (citing Restrepo, 966 F.2d at 972).
130. Id. (citing Restrepo, 966 F.2d at 972; United States v. Register, 931 F.2d 308, 311
(5th Cir. 1991)).
131. 80 F.3d 129 (5th Cir. 1996).
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cient basis for probable cause for a warrantless arrest and a subsequent
search. Although the court dealt with an issue of first impression, it re-
lied heavily on the established principle that an alert from a narcotics-
sniffing dog may alone suffice to create probable cause.
The electronic tracking device at issue was given to the defendant dur-
ing an armed bank robbery in two packets of "bait money.' 132 The de-
fendant, however, spilled some of the money as he exited the bank,
including one of the packets containing "bait money." The defendant
was arrested about forty minutes later by an officer who tracked his signal
with a vehicular tracking unit. A subsequent search of the vehicle's trunk
revealed evidence implicating the defendant in the robbery, including the
"bait money" and detailed plans of the robbery.
The defendant contended on appeal that the district court erred in ad-
mitting evidence, over his objection, in violation of his Fourth Amend-
ment rights. At the heart of the defendant's argument was his contention
that the signal transmitted from the tracking device did not provide suffi-
cient probable cause for his arrest and the subsequent search of his vehi-
cle. In support of this argument, the defendant pointed to the fact that
simultaneous signals were received from different parts of the city be-
cause one tracking device remained at the bank.133
The Fifth Circuit, like the district court, rejected the defendant's argu-
ment.'3 The court pointed to testimony at the suppression hearing that
the tracking system at issue had proven ninety-five to ninety-seven per-
cent effective at apprehending bank robbers during its eleven years in
use.135 The officer who arrested the defendant also testified that he sys-
tematically eliminated all other vehicles in the area before concluding
that the defendant's vehicle contained the tracking device.
In reaching its conclusion, the court analogized to cases holding that a
dog alert to narcotics is alone sufficient to create probable cause. 136 The
court reasoned that the electronic device at issue was at least as reliable
as a dog sniff and, as such, gave the officer probable cause to arrest the
defendant. Finally, the court, citing Sinisterra, concluded that the war-
rantless automobile search did not violate the defendant's Fourth
Amendment rights because probable cause alone justifies a warrantless
search of a vehicle lawfully parked in a public place. 137
132. Id. at 131. The tracking device was utilized as a joint effort by the Austin police
and local financial institutions to apprehend bank robbers. Id.
133. Id. at 132.
134. Id. at 133.
135. Id.
136. Id. (citing United States v. Williams, 69 F.3d 27, 28 (5th Cir. 1995)).
137. Id. (citing Sinisterra, 77 F.3d at 104). Although the defendant was arrested at the
scene, the court made no analysis as to whether the search of his vehicle was permissible as
a search incident to a lawful arrest.
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4. Limitations on Consent to a Search
In United States v. Jaras,138 the Fifth Circuit faced questions regarding
the scope of consent to search a vehicle and its contents.139 The court
illustrated its willingness to enforce the requirement that an individual
with actual or apparent authority must give consent in order to sustain
the search.
In Jaras, the driver of a vehicle gave consent to a search of the vehicle.
When the officer found a garment bag and two suitcases in the trunk, the
driver claimed ownership of the garment bag, but claimed that the suit-
cases belonged to the defendant passenger.140 The officer searched all
three bags and found marijuana in two of the suitcases.141 The district
court denied the defendant passenger's pre-trial suppression motion and
the defendant appealed.
On appeal, the defendant contended that the search of the two suit-
cases was illegal because it was conducted without a warrant and without
valid consent. In acknowledging valid consent, the court made clear that
the government must demonstrate either that the defendant himself con-
sented to the search or that consent was obtained from a third party with
authority to give valid consent.' 42 As to the two suitcases at issue, the
court explained that the government must establish that the driver had
actual or apparent authority to consent to a search of the luggage. 143
The Jaras court first concluded that the driver lacked actual authority
to consent to a search of the luggage. To establish actual authority, the
court explained that the government must prove that the party who gave
consent and the party challenging the search
mutually used the property searched and had joint access to and con-
trol of it for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that
either user had the right to permit inspection of the property and
that the complaining co-user had assumed the risk that the con-
senting co-user might permit the search. 44
As to the issue of actual authority, the court made clear that merely plac-
ing suitcases in the trunk of a car and riding as a passenger do not vest the
driver with joint access or control.
The court also found that the driver lacked apparent authority to con-
sent to a search of the luggage. 145 According to the court, even if the
officer subjectively believed that the driver had authority to consent to
138. 86 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 1996).
139. The officer conducted a warrantless search of the vehicle during a traffic stop. The
government conceded that the search was not justifiable by probable cause; as such, the
validity of the search rested entirely on the effectiveness of the consent given for the
search. Id. at 388-89.
140. Id. at 386. The court noted that the truthfulness of the driver's statement about
the ownership of the luggage was irrelevant.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 389 (citing United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974)).
143. Id. (citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 186-87 (1990)).
144. Id. (quoting United States v. Rizk, 842 F.2d 111, 112-13 (5th Cir. 1988)).
145. Id.
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the disputed search, his belief would have been unreasonable under the
circumstances. 146 The driver did not purport to possess authority to con-
sent. To the contrary, the driver unequivocally disavowed ownership of
the luggage. This statement, the court explained, indicated that the
driver's consent to the search did not purport to extend to the luggage. 147
The Jaras court also rejected the government's argument that the de-
fendant had "impliedly consented" to the search of the luggage. 148 In
support of its argument, the government pointed to the fact that the de-
fendant was aware that the driver had consented to a search of the vehi-
cle and made no objection as the officer searched his suitcases. But, the
court found that these circumstances did not warrant the inference that
the defendant passenger consented to the search. The court noted that
the officer did not ask the defendant passenger whether he would consent
to the search and that the defendant passenger was not present when the
driver consented to the search.
5. Standing Required to Challenge a Search
The Fifth Circuit reversed a district court's suppression order relating
to evidence seized during a warrantless search of a rented automobile in
United States v. Riazco. 49 The court addressed the issue of authority to
challenge a search. This time, however, the court's conclusion resulted in
admission, rather than suppression, of the evidence.
In Riazco, an officer's search of a rental car revealed cocaine hidden in
the speaker cavities. 50 The officer had conducted the search after its
driver, a non-English speaking person, signed a consent form written in
English. The district court ruled that the driver, but not the passenger,
had standing to challenge the search of the rental car and that the search
was conducted without valid consent because of the language barrier.15'
The Fifth Circuit reversed based on the conceded fact that the defend-
ant driver did not rent the car, was not authorized to drive the rental car,
and did not even know who had rented the car.'5 2 The court explained
that whether a defendant has standing to challenge an allegedly illegal
search is established by a two-part inquiry: "(1) whether the defendant is
able to establish an actual, subjective expectation of privacy with respect
to the place being searched or items being seized, and (2) whether that
expectation of privacy is one which society would recognize as objectively
146. See id.
147. Id. at 390.
148. Id.
149. 91 F.3d 752, 753 (5th Cir. 1996).
150. The officer determined that the car was a rental car during the traffic stop, but
prior to the search. The passenger, in fact, produced the rental agreement upon the of-
ficer's request. Id.
151. Id. at 753-54.
152. Id. The passenger, who was also arrested upon discovery of the cocaine, also was
not listed as an authorized driver on the rental agreement. Id. at 753.
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reasonable. ' 153 The court concluded that, under this standard, the de-
fendant driver, as an unauthorized driver of the vehicle, lacked standing
to challenge the search because the driver had no property or possessory
interest in the vehicle. 154 In the court's view, any actual, subjective pri-
vacy expectation with respect to the vehicle would be unreasonable. 155
6. Withdrawal of Consent to a Search
In United States v. Ho,156 the Fifth Circuit addressed the propriety of a
search incident to an arrest where the defendant revoked his consent to
the search prior to his arrest. Under these circumstances, the validity of
the search is wholly dependent on whether the officer had probable cause
to make the arrest before the defendant withdrew his consent. 57 The
court applied careful analysis in determining the timing effect of the with-
drawal of consent.
The arresting officer in Ho, a member of the New Orleans Interna-
tional Airport Narcotics Interdiction Unit, initially suspected the defend-
ant of drug trafficking based on his suspicious behavior after deboarding
a flight from Los Angeles. 58 The investigation took an unexpected and
sudden turn when the defendant first consented to a search of his portfo-
lio and then suddenly attempted to retrieve the portfolio when the officer
focused on a blank, white plastic card the size of a credit card. The officer
struggled with the defendant, retained possession of the portfolio, and
discovered that the white card had a magnetic strip on the back. The
officer then arrested the defendant for possession of a counterfeit credit
card. 159
As to the propriety of the search, the Fifth Circuit first noted that war-
rantless searches are justified if conducted incident to a lawful arrest.1 60
To justify the search, however, the warrantless arrest must be based on
probable cause. 161 The court explained that because the officer contin-
ued the search after the defendant withdrew his consent, the continued
search was constitutionally permissible only if the officer had probable
cause to arrest the defendant at the time the defendant withdrew his
153. Id. at 754 (quoting United States v. Kye Soo Lee, 898 F.2d 1034, 1037-38 and n.5
(5th Cir. 1990)).
154. Id. at 754-55.
155. Id. The court also noted that its holding was not inconsistent with cases from other
circuits. Id. at 754-55 (citing United States v. Wellons, 32 F.3d 117, 119 (4th Cir. 1994);
United States v. Roper, 918 F.2d 885, 887-88 (10th Cir. 1990)).
156. 94 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
157. Id. at 933-34.
158. Id. at 934, 938.
159. A later search revealed another similar blank credit card, seventeen counterfeit
travelers checks and a piece of paper containing credit card numbers. The defendant was
charged with knowingly possessing counterfeit securities. Id.
160. Id. at 935 (citing United States v. Barton, 17 F.2d 85, 89 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 148 (1994)).
161. Id. (citing United States v. Wadley, 59 F.3d 510, 512 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 240 (1996)).
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consent.162
Based on the undisputed facts, the court made clear that whether the
arrest was constitutionally sound turned solely on whether the officer's
discovery of a blank, white plastic card the size of a credit card created
probable cause to believe that the defendant had committed or was com-
mitting a crime. The court held that there was no probable cause. 163
In reaching its conclusion on the probable cause issue, the court placed
great emphasis on the officer's testimony regarding the importance of the
discovery of the magnetic strip to his determination that the card was
fraudulent. 164 Without knowledge of the magnetic strip, the court ex-
plained that the officer's discovery of the card might have created a mere
suspicion of wrongdoing, but not probable cause. 165 Thus, the court
stated that "the discovery of the magnetic strip after [the defendant] re-
voked his consent was an essential element of the probable cause deter-
mination for an officer with [the arresting officer's] knowledge and
experience."'1 66 In sum, the court concluded that the arrest was made
without probable cause and, therefore, the evidence obtained incident to
the illegal arrest was suppressed as the fruit of an unlawful search.1 67
7. Permissibility of Forcibly Obtaining Blood and Hair Samples for
DNA Testimony
In United States v. Bullock,168 the Fifth Circuit indicated its willingness
to uphold the' taking of blood and hair samples pursuant to a warrant
based on probable cause, even when the defendant forcibly objects to the
procedure. In Bullock, the police suspected the defendant of robbing a
bank based on a report of a security guard at the defendant's apartment
complex.' 69 In the bank parking lot, the police found a baseball cap
matching the description of the one worn by the robber; the hat con-
tained a substance suitable for DNA testing. Thus, while the defendant
was in custody, law enforcement officers obtained a warrant to obtain
162. Id Ordinarily, the defendant bears the burden of proving that the search or
seizure was unconstitutional. In this case, however, the government was charged with the
burden of proof because the search was conducted without a warrant. Id. at 936.
163. Id. at 937.
164. Id. at 936-37.
165. Id. at 937-38.
166. Id. at 937. The court also pointed to three other factors to buttress its conclusion.
First, the court noted that the government had offered no explanation as to why a white
plastic card should create probable cause to believe that it is fraudulent. Second, the gov-
ernment offered no evidence as to the arresting officer's knowledge of credit card fraud.
Finally, and relatedly, the arresting officer was investigating the defendant for possible
drug offenses; as such, until discovery of the magnetic strip, there was no predicate back-
ground in the investigation to support the fraudulent character of the card. Id. at 937-38.
167. Id. at 938 (citing Wadley, 59 F.3d at 512).
168. 71 F.3d 171 (5th Cir. 1995).
169. Id. The police also discovered that, approximately fifteen minutes after the rob-
bery, a cash deposit was made to the defendant's bank account, bringing the account to its
highest level in months. A search of the defendant's apartment conducted pursuant to a
warrant revealed $4,052 in bills identified as having come from the robbed bank. Id.
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blood and hair samples. 170 He kicked, hit, and attempted to bite the
agents until the agents handcuffed him between two cots and ultimately
obtained the samples.171
In a pretrial suppression motion, the defendant sought the exclusion of
the blood and hair samples on grounds that the medical procedure consti-
tuted an unreasonable intrusion, despite the existence of probable
cause.' 72 The court balanced the three factors enunciated by the
Supreme Court in Schmerber v. California:173
1) the extent to which the procedure may threaten the safety or
health of the individual; 2) the extent of intrusion upon the individ-
ual's dignitary interest in personal privacy and bodily integrity; and,
weighed against these interests, 3) the community's interest in fairly
and accurately determining guilt and innocence. 174
In balancing the first factor, the court noted that a registered nurse
took the samples using proper technique. As such, the procedure did not
pose any threat to the defendant's health or safety. Therefore, the first
factor weighed in the government's favor.175
The second Schmerber factor also favored the government. The court
reached this conclusion on grounds that the procedure was virtually risk
and pain free and, as the Supreme Court has recognized, blood tests
"have become routine in our everyday life."'1 76 The court made clear that
the use of force was only caused by the defendant's non-compliance and
was judicially authorized in the event of the defendant's refusal.' 77
Finally, as to the third factor, the court found the government's need
for the scientific evidence to be great. The court pointed out the lack of
an eyewitness identification of the defendant, and the defendant's intent
to rely on an alibi defense. Therefore, the court concluded, the scientific
evidence was essential to establishing the defendant's guilt or inno-
cence.' 78 Based on its consideration of the Schmerber factors, the court
held the search to be a reasonable one, with a relatively minor risk and a
limited intrusion. 179
170. The defendant was taken into custody after he was stopped for speeding and the
officers discovered warrants issued for his arrest for traffic violations. Id. at 173-74.
171. Id. at 174.
172. Id. at 175 (citing Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985)).
173. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
174. Bullock, 71 F.3d at 176 (citing Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 757).
175. Id.
176. Id. (quoting Skinner v. Railway Labor Exec. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 625 (1989)).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 177.
179. Id.
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